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ABSTRACT
Critics of Head Start contend that many programs spend too much money on programs extraneous
to education.   On the other hand, Head Start advocates argue that severely disadvantaged children
need a broad range of services.  Given the available evidence, it has been impossible to assess the
validity of these claims.   In this study, we match detailed administrative data with data on child
outcomes from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, including test scores, behavior
problems, and grade repetition.   We find that former Head Start children have higher reading scores
and are less likely to have been retained in grade where Head Start spending was higher.   Holding
per capita expenditures constant, children in programs that devoted higher shares of their budgets
to education and health have fewer behavior problems and are less likely to have been retained in
grade.   However, when we examine specific educational inputs holding per capita expenditures
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Introduction
Head Start is a preschool program for disadvantaged children that aims to provide early
intervention so that children can begin schooling on an equal footing with their more advantaged
peers.   The program is designed to address a wide variety of needs in addition to providing early
educational experiences.  For example, federal guidelines mandate that children receive
nutritious meals, that their medical needs be assessed, and that parents be involved in the
program.  Begun in 1965 as part of President Johnson's "War on Poverty", in 2000 Head Start
served 857,664 children in predominantly part-day programs, about 65% of eligible 3 and 4 year
old poor children.
1   Over time, federal funding has increased from $96 million in 1965 to $5.3
billion in 2000.
   There have been dozens of studies of Head Start and related preschool and early school
enrichment programs.
2  These studies have established that early intervention programs can have
a dramatic effect on children’s lives.  For example, the Perry Preschool Project and the Carolina
Abecedarian Projects demonstrated long-term gains in academic achievement, as well as
reductions in teen pregnancy and crime,  in the context of well-executed randomized trials.    
Although Head Start Centers are typically of lower quality than these model programs (but of
higher average quality than other child care available to low income parents), Head Start has also
been shown to have both short-run and long-run positive impacts on children.   Garces, Thomas,3 According to the Head Start performance standards laid out in the Federal Register, a
disabled child is one with mental retardation, hearing or visual impairments, autism, brain injury,
and other health impairments or specific learning disabilities.  At state discretion, the term may
also be applied to children suffering developmental delays.  States are mandated to provide
services to disabled preschool children, and may choose to do so either through Head Start or in
2
and Currie (2002) find long-term effects of Head Start participation on the educational
achievements and criminal behavior of young adults, while Currie and Thomas (1995) find
higher test scores and lower grade repetition among former child participants.  However, Head
Start does not appear to bring poor children up to the average levels of achievement of non-poor
children. 
The recognition that Head Start may not be enough to prevent the intergenerational
transmission of poverty has led to divergent prescriptions for reform.  On the one hand, critics
argue that  Head Start’s core mission should be educational, and that in many centers funding for
educational services has been diverted to, for example, programs for parents (Abell Foundation,
2000).   Concern has also been expressed about low levels of teacher pay and qualifications.  The
1990 Bush Presidential Campaign’s proposal to transfer responsibility for the program from the
Department of Health and Human Services to the Department of Education symbolized this view
that the program should be focused more exclusively on education. 
On the other hand, advocates argue that disadvantaged children have a wide range of
needs that must be met before they can learn academic material effectively, so that it is
appropriate for Head Start to offer a range of services.   For example, in coordination with state
agencies, Head Start currently provides disabled children (broadly defined to include children
with developmental delays) with speech and language therapy, occupational and physical
therapy, special education, and mental health services.
3   Advocates argue that more funding isconjunction with Head Start.  E.g. Head Start may be used to provide an “inclusive experience”
for a child who receives more specialized therapy elsewhere.
4 The most recent federally-sponsored study of Head Start is the Family and Child
Experiences Survey (Zill, Resnick and McKey, undated).  Unfortunately this study took a short-
term perspective, following children over the course of one year in Head Start, and had no
control group.  The study found that children showed gains in social skills over the course of the
year.  Cognitive gains were assessed by comparing the Head Start children to national norms. 
These findings were consistent with those of many other studies which have documented short-
term gains, particularly to verbal skills.  A large-scale, federally-sponsored, experimental
evaluation of Head Start’s effects on short-term outcomes is currently in the field.
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necessary in order to raise Head Start quality while continuing to provide these services (Zigler
and Styfco, 1994).  
The Head Start reauthorization bill introduced by Representatives Castle and Boehner on
May 22, 2003 took a strong position on the way in which Head Start should be reformed.  It
included language stressing the importance of academic preparation and focusing on teacher
qualifications (requiring that 50 percent of teachers have a bachelor’s degree within five years,
as well as requiring all new teachers to have at least an associates degree within 3 years).  Since
the bill provided few new resources for Head Start,  money for improving teacher qualifications
would have to be taken from other aspects of the program. 
These considerations make it especially timely and important to “get inside the black
box” of Head Start program quality, and determine which aspects of the program have the
greatest impact on child outcomes.  There has been little previous research on this question,
primarily because of a paucity of data linking Head Start program characteristics to child
outcomes.
4  This paper provides a  look into the box, by linking administrative data on Head
Start program quality to information about child test scores, behavior problems, and grade
repetition  from a large, national sample of children drawn from the National Longitudinal4
Survey of Youth 1979 Child and Young Adult Data (NLSY).   We estimate models in which the
key variable is the interaction between whether or not a child attended Head Start, and per capita
spending on Head Start in the year and county that a child was four years old.   That is, we
examine the difference in future outcomes between Head Start children in high and low spending
areas, using the difference between non-Head Start children in high and low spending areas as a
control. 
We find that relative to other children who were in the same location at age four, Head
Start children have higher reading scores and are less likely to have been retained in grade where
Head Start spending was higher.  Holding per capita expenditures constant, children in programs
that devoted higher shares to education and health also do better.  However, when we examine
specific educational inputs, only pupil/teacher ratios matter.  Teacher salaries and the fraction of
teachers with qualifications including the BA degree have little effect on child outcomes.  These
surprising results may reflect the fact that most Head Start teachers already have qualifications,
and that salaries are not as low as has been suggested, given that most Head Start teachers work
part time.  Our findings suggest that current proposals for the reform of Head Start may not have
the desired impact.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows: Section II provides some background
information about Head Start, Section III describes the data, section IV discusses methods,
results are presented in section V, and section VI offers some conclusions.
II. Background
Head Start is a federal-local matching grant program.  Local grantees apply to the5
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for funds to run their programs on a three
year cycle.  Head Start grantees must provide 20 percent of program costs, either in cash or in
kind.  Incumbents appear to have priority for funding.  For example, they have the right to appeal
if their applications for funding are turned down, while would be new entrants do not. 
Applications are evaluated on the basis of: “the extent to which the applicants demonstrate in
their application the most effective Head Start program”; the cost-effectiveness of the proposed
program; the qualifications and experience of the applicant and of the staff; the capability to
adhere to the Head Start Performance Standards; and the need for Head Start services in the
community (DHHS, 2001, section 1302.1).   
Every year, the federal government appropriates funding for Head Start.  This funding is
then allocated to each state using a formula that depends on the relative number of children from
birth to age four who are living in families with incomes below the poverty line in each state, as
compared to all states (DHHS, June 2002).   In addition to their regular grant applications,
grantees can apply for additional funds for cost of living adjustments, quality improvements, and
for Training and Technical Assistance (two percent of all Head Start funds are set aside for this
purpose).   Money is also made available periodically for special initiatives.  For example, in
2002, $6 million was available for initiatives to “develop new and innovative approaches
designed to increase the involvement of fathers in their local Head Start program”, and DHHS
announced that they would fund between 10 and 30 of these special grants in each region.  A
further $3 million was available for programs that would promote “positive youth development”
through involvement in local Head Start programs (DHHS, 2002b).  In 2003, special funds were
available for Head Start programs that had partnerships with historically black universities,6
and/or with Latino service agencies (DHHS, 2003).  These special initiatives are advertised in
the Federal Register.
These considerations suggest that grantees will receive larger amounts of funding if : the
federal government allocates more money for Head Start in the annual appropriation; if grantees
have the expertise to write good proposals and stay on top of special program announcements; or
if grantees can raise a larger matching component locally, are in a high-need area, and/or have
relatively few other programs applying in their state.   In addition, per capita funding could vary
because of fluctuations in enrollments or because of inflation given the three year funding cycle. 
However, we found that enrollment changed relatively little over time in most programs, which
is consistent with anecdotal evidence that many programs have waiting lists.  And inflation was
low over most of the period we consider.
Two of these potential sources of variation in per capita expenditures have the potential
to complicate the interpretation of our results.   First, to the extent that good Head Start directors
both write better proposals, and run better programs, we could wrongly attribute the effect of
having a better director to spending.  We will test for this possibility below using data on the
qualifications of program directors.   Second, if it is easier to raise matching funds in wealthy
areas, and these areas also offer other enrichment activities for children, then we may wrongly
attribute the effects of local amenities to Head Start spending.   The inclusion of non-Head Start
children as a control group helps to control for this possibility, but we also include detailed
controls for characteristics of the child’s county of residence at age four and state fixed effects,
and we estimate models using only the subset of relatively poor counties.   It is worth noting that
to the extent that local areas direct more resources to places with especially disadvantaged5 As the names suggest, the federal government gives money to a Head Start grantee,
which may or may not pass the money onto one or several “delegate agencies”.  (That is, the
grantee could also be the agency that ran the center).  A unit of observation in the administrative
data is therefore defined by the grantee’s number, the delegate agency’s number, and the year.
6 In principal, the administrative data contains information about many aspects of Head
Start programs.  However, in practice, data for many of the variables is often coded as missing or
zero (when it could not be zero).  In this paper, we focus on the budget data, which is relatively
complete, and on selected inputs which do not suffer as greatly from missing data problems.
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children, we may also end up under-estimating the effects of spending on Head Start.
Finally, it is useful to consider the way that children are selected into Head Start
programs.  Program standards direct agencies to develop a recruitment process to help them
reach “those most in need of Head Start services” and specify that the “use of referrals from
other public and private agencies” is one way to achieve this goal (U.S. Dept. of Health and
Human Services, 2003, Section 1305.5).   Children on the waiting list are to be ranked in terms
of each agency’s selection criteria to insure that the neediest are admitted first.   It will be
important to keep this selection in mind in what follows.
III. Data
Data about Head Start programs comes from two sources: Program Information Reports
(PIRs) and an administrative data set on Head Start budgets called PCCOST.  The PIRs are filled
out by each Head Start grantee, delegate agency and Parent Child Center (PCC) in most years,
and cover the period 1988 to 2000.
5    They provide information about the educational
qualifications of staff, teacher pay, teacher turnover, and much more.
6  The PCCOST data spans
the period 1990 to 2001 and has information about the sources and disposition of Head Start
program funds, breakdowns of enrollment by the type of children served, and information about7 The grade repetition questions were only asked to children 10 and over in the 1986 and
1988 surveys.  Hence, there are fewer observations for grade repetition than for some of the
other outcomes.   Also, in 2000, the survey did not ask about whether Kindergarten had been
repeated. In addition to the question about Head Start, mothers were also asked whether children
attended some other form of preschool, which should have helped to clarify that Head Start is
distinct from other preschools.  In our data, 69 percent of children are reported to have attended
other preschools, so that some children attended both Head Start and other preschools.
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the director and other administrative staff.  The PCCOST data also has the FIPS county code,
which enables us to merge it with the NLSY data.   
The PCCOST data was generated by a computer program that many agencies used to
fulfill their administrative reporting requirements.  However, agencies were not required to use
the program, and some did not do so in every year.   Moreover, the program was phased in
during the early 1990s, and started to be phased out around 1998 (in favor of a replacement
program) so that the years 1996, 1997, and 1998 are those with the most complete reporting. 
Hence, in order to preserve sample size, we went through the data casting backward and forward
as many as three years to fill in missing observations.  The administrative data is also fairly
noisy, necessitating some data cleaning and removal of outliers.   For example, we deleted a
small number of agency-year observations that reported enrollments of fewer than 10 children,
or per capita expenditures of less than $500 per child.
The NLSY data tracks the children of the roughly 6,000 young women who took part in
the original NLSY survey, which began in 1979.  Hence, a great deal of information is available
about the characteristics of mothers, including their county of residence in each year, and their
score on the Armed Forces Qualifications Test (AFQT), a test of job skills.  Beginning in 1986,
the children have been surveyed and assessed biannually.   Mothers were asked whether the child
had ever attended Head Start and whether the child had repeated any grades.
7   For each child,8 The NLSY offers two normalizations of the Behavior Problems Index.  Results using
the index that is not normalized by sex produced very similar results.
9 For further information about these data, see the NLSY79 Child and Young Adults
User’s Guide 2000 which is available at http://www.bls.gov/nls/y79cyaguide/nlsy79cusg.htm.
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we have scores for tests of vocabulary (the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, or PPVT), reading
(the Peabody International Assessment Tests for reading recognition (PIAT-RR) and reading
comprehension (PIAT-RC)), mathematics (PIAT mathematics), as well as an index of behavior
problems (normalized separately by sex).
8  
There are different numbers of observations available for each test, given that they were
administered to children in different age ranges.  Also, the reading comprehension test was
administered only to children who scored above a threshold level on the reading recognition test.
We use all non-missing observations for each score, in order to preserve the maximum possible
number of observations.
9
It is important to examine a wide range of indicators, particularly since there is a good
deal of controversy about the use of standardized tests to measure student achievement.   Among
the test scores we examine, minority children perform particularly badly on the PPVT, and better
(relative to white non-Hispanic children) on the PIATs.    There is increasing evidence that non-
cognitive skills are important in determining eventual outcomes (c.f. Heckman et al., 2000).  For
example, evidence from evaluations of model preschool programs suggests that there may be
improvements in long-term outcomes including educational attainment even in the absence of
lasting gains in test scores.  Hence, we examine grade repetition and behavior problems. 
In order to merge the administrative data with the NLSY data, we proceeded as follows. 
First, we identified the calendar year in which a child was four years old.   Second, we retained10 On average there are 2.8 observations per child on the PIAT-MATH and PIAT-RR
tests, 2.3 observations on the PIAT-RC, and 1.4 observations on the PPVT.  Thus, we might
expect estimates for PPVT to be noisier than those the PIATs.  
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scores only for children 60 months of age and older.  In this way, we avoid using scores that
could have been measured before the child attended Head Start.   Third, we took the mean of all
age-normalized percentile scores available for each child, in order to arrive at one observation
per child.
10  One advantage of this procedure relative to examining test scores at a particular age,
is that there are many fewer missing values.  For example, a child who was surveyed at age 4 in
1990, skipped an interview, and then was reassessed at age 8 in 1994 would not have any test
score available for age 6.  A second advantage is that averaging over several test scores is likely
to give a more accurate measure of the child’s abilities than taking a single test score.  Previous
analyses of these data have shown that as much as half of the total variation in test scores is
within child, rather than between child (Currie and Thomas, 1995).  
We lose 403 children for whom information on Head Start attendance is missing, 292
children with poor matches to the administrative data (as discussed further below), 179 children
for whom information on the mother’s AFQT scores was missing, and we also exclude a further
111 children whose reported permanent income (defined as the mean over all of the incomes
reported by the mother in the NLSY) was greater than $150,000,  for a total usable sample of
4,468 children.  
Three complications arose with the actual merge of the two data sets.   First, while most
counties were served by only one Head Start program, some counties are served by more than11 The average number of programs per county was 1.5, but the 50
th percentile of the
distribution of the number of programs was 1, the 75
th percentile was 2, and the 95
th percentile
was 3.  
11
one program.
11  In these cases, we took a weighted average of the characteristics of programs
serving the county, where the weights were the number of children in each program.  Second,
even after filling in missing values in the way described above, there were instances in which we
could not find an appropriate administrative match for the NLSY data in a particular year.   In
these cases, we took data from the nearest available year.   We kept only NLSY observations that
could be matched to an administrative data point within plus or minus three years of the year that
the child was aged 4.  Third, we assume that all of the NLSY children attended center-based
programs, though a small number of them could have been in primarily home-based programs.  
The implicit assumption we have relied on in filling in missing administrative data, is
that programs change relatively slowly over time within counties.  In fact, if we decompose the
variance in the administrative data into within and between components, we generally find that
the lion’s share of the variation is across agencies.  For example, the between component of the
variance in enrollments is 449 compared to a within component of 108, while the comparable
figures for per capita expenditures are 1682 vs. 827.   By smoothing within-agency variation in
spending, we will tend to attenuate its effects, and thus the estimates presented below may be
under-estimates of the true effects of Head Start expenditures on outcomes. 
Table 1 shows means of the administrative data for all agency-years with information on
per capita expenditures, for agency-years that are missing data on per capita expenditures (and
thus are excluded from our analysis), and for the subset of the data that we match to NLSY
children.  The NLSY data are further broken out by race and ethnicity, as well as by whether the12 Cash on the balance sheet includes money from the Administration for Children,
Youth, and Families, and “non-federal share cash”.  The total spending also includes a small
amount of “other cash”, money from USDA, “non-federal share” in-kind, and “other in-kind”. 
One reason for keeping track of the budget in these categories is that programs are required to
partially match federal contributions with cash and in-kind funding from other sources.  There
are also limits on how much can be spent on particular budget items.  For example, programs
cannot spend more than 15 percent of on the balance sheet funds on administration.
13 It is important to keep in mind that the Hispanic sample in the NLSY includes only
children born to mothers who were already in the country in 1978.  Hence, it is not
representative of the experience of more recent arrivals, or of immigrant children.
12
county was poor, as discussed further below.  All dollar amounts are in real 1998 dollars. 
The first three rows of  Table 1 show total enrollments, per capita funding “on the
balance sheet”, and total per capita funding including “in-kind” transfers.
12  Head Start centers
are required to give breakdowns of the “on the balance sheet” portion of their budgets into ten
categories including: administration, education, services for the disabled, occupancy costs (i.e.
rent, utilities, etc.), health, parent services, social programming, nutrition programs,
transportation and “other”, so we will focus most of our investigation on this on-the-balance
sheet portion of the budget, though we show below that our results are not sensitive to the choice
of expenditure measure.   The shares spent on various services are viewed as an important
indicator of program priorities.  For example, the PCCOST manual states that “a grantee with
80% of its budget allocated to Education would clearly be stating that providing educational
services was of paramount importance to that agency” (DHHS, 1999, page 27).  We aggregate
expenditures related to disability, nutrition, and health into one category, so that we are left with
expenditures on education, all health, and “other”.
We include information about the race and ethnic breakdown of children served by the
programs
13, as well as information about some specific educational inputs that are often13
examined in the literature on school quality.  These include pupil/teacher ratios, teacher salaries,
the fraction of teachers with qualifications, the average education of Head Start teachers, and the
qualifications of the Head Start program director.
Table 1 shows first, that there is little difference in other respects between agency-years
for which per capita funding data was reported, and agency-years for which it is missing.  
Columns 3 and 4 break out programs with high and low per capita spending, in order to see
whether there are any systematic differences in spending patterns across these programs.  While
there is considerable variation across all programs in, for example, the share of the budget spent
on health related activities, the share does not differ systematically between high and low
spending programs.  Rather, the mean shares spent on different activities are remarkably similar
across the columns, suggesting that higher spending programs spend proportionately more on all
types of activities.   
Table 1 also shows that relative to all programs, the programs matched to NLSY children
are larger (mean enrollments of 704 vs. 487) and funded at somewhat lower levels (total per
capita funding of $4793 vs. $5260).    We believe that these differences reflect the sampling
scheme in the NLSY–sampled children were apparently unlikely to be located in counties that
had very small Head Start programs.   The NLSY children also tend to be in programs that have
lower fractions of white children, and higher fractions of black and Hispanic children, on
average.   Despite these differences, other aspects of the programs are quite similar–the main
exceptions are that compared to the full sample, the NLSY children have teachers and directors14 Note that the pupil/teacher ratios in Table 1 are higher than the mandated maximum
class size.  Head Start classes are supposed to have between 15 and 20 students.  The reason for
this discrepancy is that we are dividing all children who have been enrolled by the number of
teachers, which tends to give a high estimate.   That is, to the extent that there is turnover (on
average children in our sample were in programs with 7.7% turnover), more children will have
been enrolled in the program than are present at any point in time.  We chose this estimate
because it is difficult to know exactly how many children are enrolled at a point in time, and for
consistency with the per capita expenditure figures which are computed using all children served
by the program in the fiscal year.   We have also estimated models similar to those in Table 7
using the interaction of turnover rates with Head Start as our “input” and did not find any
statistically significant effect.
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who are slightly better paid, and have higher pupil/teacher ratios.
14 
The Table indicates that despite concerns about teacher qualifications, 85 percent of
teachers are qualified.   The 1994 Head Start Reauthorization Act required that by September 30,
1996, Head Start classroom teachers had to have a Child Development Associate degree; a state-
awarded certificate for preschool teachers; an associate, baccalaureate, or advanced degree in
early childhood education; or a degree in a field related to early childhood, with experience in
teaching and a state awarded certificate to teach in a preschool program.   We do see an increase
in the fraction of teachers with qualifications in our data, from 80 percent in 1991/92 to 92
percent in 1997.  Twenty-two percent of programs report that their average teacher has a B.A.
degree or higher, a fraction that had increased to 34 percent by 1997.
It is striking that despite their qualifications, teachers receive what seems be very low
pay, averaging $16,428 per year.  It is possible that this reflects the part-time nature of the
typical program.  The data indicate that on average, Head Start teachers work 5 hours per day,
for 193 days during the year.  Hence, this salary implies an hourly wage rate of $17.50 per hour,
which is comparable to the average hourly wage of $17.93 ($1998) that workers with B.A.
degrees received in 2001 (authors’ computation from the May Current Population Survey).   The15 These salary figures do not include fringe benefits, and Head Start teachers may or may
not receive such benefits as health insurance and retirement plans.  Note, that the PCCOST data
attributes spending on benefits to categories of spending in the proportions that personnel are
allocated to these categories.  Thus, spending on benefits is accounted for in the budget shares.
16 Fewell and Scott (1999) report that the Infant Health and Development Program,
another well-known early intervention whose long term effects are currently being assessed, also
cost about $15,000 per year per child.
15
average salary received by Head Start program directors is $36,877 which is similar to the salary
of a typical worker with a BA.
15
Per capita funding levels in Table 1 can be compared to those for “model” programs. 
The part-day Perry Preschool intervention cost $12,884 per child (in 1999 dollars) for a program
that lasted eight months a year over two years.  Since 20 percent of the children participated only
for one year, the figures imply that the cost per child was approximately $7,000 per year, so that
Head Start costs about 71 percent of what Perry Preschool cost (Karoly et al., 1998).   The
preschool component of the Carolina Abecedarian project cost about $15,000 per child, per year,
and this part of the intervention lasted five years.
16
The last four columns of  Table 1 explore differences in the programs serving children in
poor counties, and children of different racial/ethnic backgrounds.   The children’s location is
measured as of the year that they were 4.  Children are said to be in a poor county if the fraction
of families in poverty in 1989 was greater than 11 percent in their county.  Eleven percent was
the median percent poor in our sample.  Programs in poor counties, and those serving black and
Hispanic children tend to be much larger, and are slightly worse funded on average than those
serving white children: Average total funding per child is $4,894 for white children, $4,611 for
Hispanic children, $4,748 for black children, and $4,619 in poor counties.   This finding is17 In 1998, the fractions of black, Hispanic, and white Head Start children were 36, 26,
and 31 percent respectively–if all poor children had participated at equal rates, the corresponding
fractions would have been 29, 31, and 35 (authors’ calculation based on the assumption that
poverty rates for white, black, and Hispanic children were 15, 40, and 40 percent, respectively.     
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consistent with Resnick and Zill’s (undated) findings regarding the lower quality of programs
with higher shares of minority children.  The share of the budget spent on different categories is
quite similar across the four columns, with the exception that programs in poor counties and
those serving minority children tend to place greater emphasis on educational expenditures.
One of the most striking differences between programs is in the composition of peers. 
White children attend programs with the highest fraction white (49 percent), while black children
attend programs that are 66 percent black and Hispanic children attend programs that are 45
percent Hispanic.   
Table 2 shows the fraction of the NLSY children who were ever enrolled in Head Start,
measures of child outcomes, and maternal AFQT (one of the most important indicators of family
background and predictors of child test scores).   Twenty-three percent of the children were
reported to have ever attended Head Start.  In recent years, about 800,000 have been enrolled in
every year, which works out to about 14 percent of all 4 year old children and 7 percent of all
three year old children being served at any point in time (ACYF, 1998).  Given that children can
attend Head Start over a two year window, the NLSY figures seem reasonably consistent with
the administrative data.  Participation rates are also much higher for black than for white
children, which again is consistent with administrative data.
17 
The test scores that we use are normalized so that the child’s score is the percentile of the
national distribution for children of the same age.  By this metric, we can see that NLSY children17
have average scores on the PIAT-Math, somewhat higher scores on the PIAT-Reading
Recognition and Reading Comprehension tests, and quite low scores on the PPVT.   Given the
sampling frame of the NLSY, it tends to oversample children born to younger mothers, so other
things being equal, one might expect NLSY children to have lower rather than higher than
average scores.  The observed pattern may be because the norms used for the PIAT tests are
relatively dated.  The NLSY children also have scores on the behavior problems index that are 
higher than the national norm, indicating a greater incidence of behavior problems.  There are
striking differences in patterns of these scores across race and ethnic groups, with whites
typically having better scores than blacks and Hispanics.  Children in poor counties, also tend to
score more poorly.   Finally, 12.3 percent of children had ever repeated a grade by the time of the
2000 survey, and this rate varies from a low of 8.6 percent among whites to a high of 18 percent
among black children.
Differences in mothers’ backgrounds show typical patterns across race and ethnicity. 
White mothers have much higher AFQT scores than other mothers (50.97, 19.89, and 24.43, for
white, black, and Hispanic mothers respectively).  White mothers also have permanent incomes
(calculated as the mean over all reported incomes in the NLSY sample) of $51,240 compared to
$30,610 for black mothers.   Children of black and Hispanic mothers also have more siblings
than children of white mothers, and have mothers with less education on average though these
differences are not shown in the Table.
The second panel of Table 2 shows the differences between the Head Start children and
other children within each group.   Head Start children have significantly worse outcomes in
every way than other children within the same group.  For example, the average Head Start child18
has a PIAT-RR score 8.7 points lower than the average child, a difference of approximately 1/3
of a standard deviation.  The last two columns show, not surprisingly, that Head Start children
have mothers with much lower AFQT scores and permanent incomes than other children.  
Panel 3 show mean differences between Head Start and other children, adjusting for the
observable characteristics of children and mothers that we include in our regression models,
which are described further below.   A comparison of Panel 2 and Panel 3 suggests that some but
not all of the difference between Head Start and other children can be attributed to differences in
observable background characteristics.   For example, differences in PIAT-MATH scores
become statistically insignificant, and the gap in PIAT-RR scores is reduced to 2.6 points.  The
fact that some differences between Head Start and other children remain is not surprising, given
the way that these children are selected.  
IV. Methods
We estimate least squares regression models of the following form:
(1) Outcomei = a + a1Percapc + a2HeadStarti + a3Percapc*HeadStarti  + a4Xi  + a5Zc + a6S  +
a7Cohorti + ei,
where Outcome is a test score, the behavior problem index, or a measure of whether the child has
repeated a grade; i indexes the individual and c indexes the county.  Percap is per capita
expenditure in the county’s Head Start program; Head Start is an indicator equal to one if the
child attended Head Start and zero otherwise; X is a vector of mother and child characteristics18 Several previous studies compare siblings in the NLSY in order to identify the effect of
Head Start on outcomes (c.f. Currie and Thomas, 1995; Currie and Thomas, 2000; Garces,
Thomas, and Currie, 2002).  The focus in this study is different–we wish to ask whether,
conditional on having attended Head Start, the size of any estimated effect on outcomes is
affected by per capita spending on Head Start?  For our purposes, a sibling comparison would be
less than ideal, given the imprecise nature of the matching between the NLSY and the
administrative data.
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including: AFQT, permanent income, mother’s education (dropout, high school, some college,
college), mother’s race/ethnicity, mother’s number of siblings, child’s gender, whether the child
is the first born, and whether the child has more than five siblings; Z is a vector of county
characteristics including population in 1990, the percent of the population that was black in
1990, the percentage of the population that was Hispanic in 1990, the percent of births to teenage
mothers in 1988, median family income in 1989, the percentage of families below poverty in
1989, the percent of votes cast for the Democratic Presidential candidate in 1992, the percent of
the population under 18 years in 1990, and the percent older than 64 years in 1990; and S is a
vector of state fixed effects.
18  
As we saw in Table 2, this set of variables explains a considerable portion of the
difference between Head Start and other children.  The inclusion of the county-level controls,
and of the state dummy variables is intended to control for factors that might be correlated both
with variation in per capita expenditures on Head Start and with child outcomes.   Moreover, as
discussed above, per capita funding may vary with the fraction of poor children in the state,
which could also be related to child outcomes.  Cohort is a vector of dummy variables for the
year that the child was aged 4 (1988-89, 1990-91, 1992-93, 1994-95, 1996-97, 1998-99), which
allows outcomes to vary for children of different cohorts.  Finally, e is an idiosyncratic error
term.20
Percap, the main effect of per capita spending, captures the overall effect of being in a
high spending county, for both Head Start and non-Head Start children.  Counties with high
spending on Head Start could have unobserved characteristics that are associated with higher test
scores for all children.  For example, some counties might have generous community health
programs in addition to Head Start.  To the extent that counties with these characteristics also
spend more on Head Start, conditional on the included state and county characteristics, the
effects will be captured by Percap.  Table 2 suggests that the coefficient on HeadStart, a2,  is
likely to be negative because children who attend Head Start are negatively selected relative to
other children.   Thus, we can view Head Start as a proxy for the negative unobserved
characteristics of children that are associated with attending Head Start.
Our main focus is on a3, the coefficient on the interaction between Percap and Head Start. 
This coefficient measures the effect of additional spending on children who attended Head Start. 
We are essentially examining the difference between Head Start children in high and low
spending areas, using the differences in outcomes between non-Head Start children in high and
low spending areas as a control.  We might find for example, that Head Start children did better
in high spending areas than in low spending areas, but if non-Head Start children showed a
similar pattern, then a3 would not be statistically significant, and we would have to attribute the
better results in the high spending areas to some other characteristic of those areas.
A potential problem with this research strategy is that the Head Start children may be
selected differently in high and low spending counties.  Suppose, for example, that high
spending programs attract more able students.  Then it will appear that spending improves
outcomes, whereas in reality, it only changes the way that children are selected.   In addition to21
the extensive set of state and county level controls included in our regressions, we have adopted
three strategies to deal with this potential problem.  First, we conduct all of our analyses
separately for children who were in counties with high poverty rates at age 4.  Our hypothesis is
that the difference between Head Start and non-Head Start children will be more uniform within
this set of counties than it is in the country as a whole.   As we will see, our results tend to be
stronger in this more homogeneous set of counties, suggesting that heterogeneity in the way that
Head Start students are selected across counties is not driving our results.
Second, we directly examine the way that spending affects the selection of Head Start
children in terms of their mother’s AFQT scores, which is one of the most powerful predictors of
the children’s test scores.  We will show that higher spending programs do tend to attract
children with slightly better maternal AFQT scores, but the change in the way that children are
selected in terms of this observable factor is far too small to account for the gains  that we find.  
Third, we conduct a similar analysis to see if higher spending programs are less likely to
select children of low birth weight, defined as birth weight less than 2500 grams.  Children of
low birth weight are more likely to have a range of physical and behavioral problems than other
children, so if higher spending programs selected fewer low birth weight children, then this
could have an effect on measured outcomes.  However, we find no evidence of selection of this
type.  Thus, if selection on unobservables follows a similar pattern to selection on AFQT and
birth weight, it is unlikely that such selection could explain our results.
We are also interested in assessing the extent to which different types of expenditures
have different effects on outcomes.  In order to address this issue, we estimate models in which
we control not only for per capita expenditures, but also for the fraction of the budget spent on22
education, and on all health-related activities defined as the sum of the budget shares spent on 
health care, nutrition, and services for the disabled.   As Table 1 indicates, these expenditures
together account for approximately 11 percent of Head Start “cash on the balance sheet”
expenditures.  
The model we estimate takes the following form: 
(2) Outcomei = a + a1Percapc + a2HeadStarti + a3Percapc*HeadStarti  + a4ShareEdc +
a5ShareEdc*HeadStarti + a6ShareHealthc + a7ShareHealthc*HeadStarti + a8Xi  + a9Zc + a10S +
a11Cohorti + vi,
Finally, we investigate the effects of particular educational inputs, including pupil-
teacher ratios, pupil-classroom staff ratios, average teacher salaries, the fraction of teachers who
have qualifications, education of the average teacher, and Head Start director’s qualifications. 
Specifically, we estimate models of the form:
(3) Outcomei = a + a1Percapc + a2HeadStarti + a3Percapc*HeadStarti  + a4Inputc +
a5Inputc*HeadStarti + a6Xi  + a7Zc + a8S + a9Cohorti + vi,
where Input is one of the educational inputs and the other variables are defined as described
above.  This specification holds per capita spending constant.  Hence, it asks what would happen
if we increased one input holding the total budget constant, which is analogous to what
legislation requiring increased spending on particular inputs without increasing overall budgets
would do.
In addition to estimating these models separately for children in poor counties, we23
estimate them separately for children of different race/ethnic groups.  The fact that children from
these groups attend largely separate programs, have very different mean outcomes, and have
systematically different backgrounds suggests that the effects of Head Start could differ between
groups.
V. Results
a) Effects of Head Start Spending on Child Outcomes
Estimates of the effects of per capita spending in Head Start on child outcomes are shown
in Table 3.  The measure of spending used here is cash on the balance sheet.   As discussed
above, the main effect of per capita spending captures the influence of unobservables associated
with having lived in a particular county in the child’s last possible Head Start year.    These
effects are not statistically significant, suggesting that the included regressors do a good job of
controlling for other factors that are associated with both per capita spending and child
outcomes.
The estimated main effects of Head Start are not statistically significant  for PIAT-
MATH, behavior problems, or grade repetition.  However, they are significantly negative for the
reading and vocabulary scores (PIAT-RR, PIAT-RC, and PPVT).  The point estimates of -8.9, -
8.7, and -7.8 imply that children who went to Head Start would have scores that were a third of a
standard deviation lower than those of other, in the absence of the program.    At the mean level
of spending of $3,500, the coefficients imply a gap between Head Start and other children of 2.8
points for PIAT-RR, which is very similar to what we saw in Panel 3 of Table 2.  The significant
interactions for these reading and vocabulary scores imply that an increase in spending of $100024
would reduce gaps in verbal scores by between 1.4 and 1.7 points, so that an increase in
spending of $1,600 (i.e. total spending of $5,100 “on the balance sheet”) would eliminate the
gap, if the effects were linear.     
Of the variables included in our models, AFQT is among the most important
determinants of child outcomes.  The point estimates in Table 3 imply that the child’s test scores
rise by about a quarter point for every one point gain in maternal AFQT, while the probability of
grade repetition falls.   These magnitudes will be useful in assessing the effects of expenditure-
related selection into the program below.
Table 4 presents estimates obtained from several subsamples of the NLSY data.  Panel 1
shows estimates for children in poor counties.  Although the sample size has been cut in half, the
estimated effects of the interaction between Head Start and spending rises for reading scores
(PIAT-RR and PIAT-RC).  The point estimate on PPVT is very similar to that obtained in the
full sample, although the standard error rises.  Thus, the results appear to hold within this sample
of relatively homogeneous counties, as well as in the full sample.  
Panels 2 through 4 show separate estimates for children of each race/ethnic group.   The
results are very striking.   The point estimates for the effects of expenditures on PIAT-RR and
PPVT scores among white children are similar to those reported above, although they are not
statistically significant.   However, spending does appear to have a significant negative effect on
the probability of grade repetition: Every $1,000 increase in spending is associated with a four
percentage point reduction in the probability that a white Head Start child repeated a grade.   The
main effects of Head Start suggest that white children who attended Head Start have test scores
similar to those of other white children once observable differences are controlled for, but that25
they are still 19.7 percentage points more likely to have repeated a grade in the absence of the
program, so the improvement associated with increased spending is significant.
Among black children, higher expenditures appear to increase test scores across the
board, but have little effect on the probability of grade repetition.  It is particularly notable that
spending appears to increase math scores as well as reading and vocabulary scores.   This pattern
of results is consistent with the fact that the main effects of Head Start suggest that, conditional
on observables, black children who attended Head Start would have had lower test scores in the
absence of the program, but the same probability of grade repetition. 
We find no significant effects of expenditures among Hispanic children, though this
could be due in part to the relatively small sample size.  Currie and Thomas (1999) found large
positive effects of Head Start attendance in the NLSY’s Hispanic children.  Hence, an alternative
interpretation of the current finding is that while attendance has a positive effect, additional
spending does not. 
The last panel of Table 4 gives results using total per capita spending rather than “cash on
the balance sheet”.  We focused on the “on the balance sheet” measure first because this measure
can be broken out by type of expenditure, and second, because all federal payments are included
in the cash on the balance sheet measure.  Table 4 establishes that the results are qualitatively
similar for both measures, though the point estimates are smaller.  In fact, the relative
magnitudes are consistent with the interpretation that, on average, only spending “on the balance
sheet” affects child outcomes.  
The first panel of Table 5 presents estimates of the “effects” of spending on maternal
AFQT.    These regression models are of the same form as (1) except that AFQT is the26
dependent variable, and they omit maternal AFQT, permanent income, and maternal education
from the right hand side “X” vector.  Clearly, spending can have no causal impact on AFQT
since in most cases it was measured before the child was born, so any significant effect
represents a change in the way that children are selected into the program.    The first two
columns indicate that the interaction between per capita spending and “Ever Head Start” is not
statistically significant in either the whole sample, or in the poor county sample.  However, it
does appear that if we estimate the sample separately by racial and ethnic groups, high spending
programs attract white and black children with slightly higher maternal AFQT scores than lower
spending programs, while there is no evidence of such selection among Hispanics.  
Among whites, each $1000 increase in per capita expenditure is associated with 2.5 point
reduction in the maternal AFQT gap between Head Start and other children.   Table 4 allows us
to say whether this is a large or small effect: It indicates that each 1 point increase in AFQT was
associated with a one tenth of a percentage point reduction in the probability of grade repetition,
while Head Start was associated with a four percentage point reduction in the probability of
grade repetition.   That is, it would take an increase of 40 AFQT points to equal the effect of
Head Start, although the mean level of AFQT in the sample of whites is only 51.  Hence, these
estimates suggest that differential selection of children with better backgrounds into high
spending programs is unlikely to account for much of the estimated effect of Head Start.   
Among blacks, a similar comparison suggests that differential selection is likely to
explain only a small part of the estimated effect.  In addition, it is important to note that
observable differences in AFQT are controlled for in the Table 4 models, so that selection on this
important observable indicator does not bias the estimated coefficients.   27
The second panel of Table 5 shows estimates for models in which the dependent variable
is whether or not a child was low birth weight.  Again, this is something that could not be
influenced by the program, so any effect would represent selection into the program.  However,
the estimates indicate that there is no relationship between spending and whether a child who
attended was low birth weight.
Although we cannot rule out the possibility that Head Start children are selected very
differently in terms of unobservables in high spending and low spending programs, the fact that
selection on AFQT and birth weight is either negligible or non-existence suggests that this is
unlikely.
   In summary, these estimates indicate that Head Start programs that spend more per capita
have larger positive effects on children’s reading and vocabulary scores.  These effects are more
pronounced when we focus only on children in high poverty counties.   When we look at racial
and ethnic subgroups, we find that among white children higher spending results in less grade
repetition for Head Start children.  Among black children, higher spending increases Head Start
math, reading, and vocabulary test scores, but has no effect on grade repetition.
b) Getting inside the Black Box of Program Design
The results discussed thus far suggest, in contrast to much of the literature on primary 
and secondary education, that increasing per capita spending levels on Head Start might have
positive effects in terms of promoting educational attainment.  However, there are many different
ways that additional spending could be allocated.     As discussed above, some observers feel
that Head Start should focus on the educational aspect of its mandate, spending more money on 19 As discussed above, higher spending programs tend to spend more on all components
so that there is a good deal of collinearity between the levels of spending on different
components of the program.  On the other hand, there is no reason that the share of spending on
health or education should vary systematically with per capita expenditures.
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qualified teachers, and less money on other “extraneous” programs.  Other observers feel
strongly that, particularly for preschool children, it is important to offer a comprehensive
package of services.  In this section, we ask whether it is possible to shed light on this debate
using data about the way that Head Start programs allocate their budgets.
Table 6 shows estimates from models which control both for per capita expenditures and
for the share of the budget spent on education and health (i.e. the aggregate of the health,
nutrition, and disability portions of the budget).
19   The first panel of the table suggests that
allocating spending to health increases reading scores, while increasing the share of the budget
devoted to education reduces behavior problems and grade repetition.  The second panel
confirms these results in the subsample of children from high poverty counties.  Both sets of
effects are quite large.  For example, the second panel point estimate of 63.6 on the interaction of
the share of health and “ever Head Start” in the equation for PIAT-RR, implies that a 5 percent
increase in the share of spending devoted to health would increase the reading scores of Head
Start children (relative to other children) by 3.2 points.  Similarly, a 5 percent increase in the
share of the budget devoted to education would result in almost a 1.3 point reduction in the score
on the behavior problems index among the children in poor counties, and in a 1.5 percentage
point reduction in the probability of grade repetition.   
Hence given the “adjusted” mean differences between Head Start and other children in
poor areas shown in Table 2, these estimates imply that shifting five percent of the budget29
towards health (holding per capita expenditures and the share of education constant) would
eliminate the gap in PIAT-RR, and that shifting five percent of the budget towards education
(holding per capita expenditures and the share of health constant) would close half of the gap in
the behavior problems index, and one fifth of the gap in the probability of grade repetition
between Head Start and other children.
The third panel of Table 6 shows results using the share spent on education combined
with the share spent on health, nutrition, and disabilities.   This share can be thought of as the
portion of the budget devoted directly to spending on children.  The estimates are similar to
those in Panel 2, in that they suggest that increasing the share of spending devoted to children,
holding per capita expenditures constant would reduce behavior problems and the probability of
grade repetition.
We have also estimated these models separately for the three racial/ethnic groups but the
standard errors are large, so that it is difficult to say whether the shares actually have differential
effects on the three groups.    The estimates suggest however, that increasing the share spent on
education reduced behavior problems among blacks, and reduced the probability of grade
repetition among Hispanics.
The administrative data allow further investigation of the question of whether any
specific educational inputs can be shown to be beneficial.  For example, the emphasis in the
current reauthorization bill is on increasing the educational qualifications of Head Start teachers.
Table 7 examines the effect of increasing specific educational inputs holding per capita
expenditures constant.    
The first panel indicates that higher pupil-teacher ratios are associated with lower scores20 Similarly, Angrist and Guryan (2003) find that teacher certification in elementary
schools raises teacher salaries, but has no impact on their quality as measured by SAT scores.
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on tests of reading and vocabulary, and with a higher probability of grade repetition.  The second
panel examines the effect of pupil-staff ratios, since most Head Start classrooms have both
teachers and aides.  Lower pupil-staff ratios are also estimated to increase test scores, although
results are weaker, suggesting that teachers have a more positive effect on children than aides. 
This is some evidence in support of the view that teacher qualifications matter.  
However, the fraction of qualified teachers has no significant impact on outcomes, nor
does the teacher’s salary, as shown in Panels 3 and 4.
20   It is possible that the null effect for
teacher qualifications reflects the fact that the fraction with qualifications is already very
high–by 1999, over 90% of teachers had qualifications, so the perception that the average Head
Start teacher is unqualified is unfounded.   We also found little evidence that higher teacher pay
mattered, as shown in the next panel.
In the fifth panel we look at whether the average teacher is reported to have a B.A. or
higher degree.   Again, the interaction of this variable with the “ever Head Start” indicator is not
statistically significant.   Thus, given that most teachers already have a qualification such as a
child development certificate, there seems to be little measurable advantage to increasing their
education to the BA level.  
We next examine several characteristics of Head Start directors.  Recall that director
quality is a possible confounding factor, if directors who are able to obtain more funds, also run
programs that are better in other respects.  However, we find no evidence that director education,
experience, or salary are positively related to outcomes among Head Start children.  We have31
estimated similar models examining the effects of  having a director who is full-time rather than
part-time, and examining the average teacher’s experience, and also find little effect on Head
Start children’s outcomes.
On the whole then, these results provide some support for the argument that increasing
the share of expenditures devoted to educational programming would benefit Head Start
children.  But they suggest that educational dollars would be better spent reducing pupil-teacher
ratios rather than on increasing teacher qualifications and/or salaries.   Moreover, the estimates
indicate that expenditures on health programming (broadly defined to include nutrition and
programming for the disabled) is also beneficial, so that reallocating funds from health programs
to education might prove counter-productive.   
This finding supports the Head Start advocate’s contention that it is difficult to educate
children who are sick,  hungry, or who have undiagnosed learning disabilities, and is consistent
with a large body of evidence that poor health in childhood has negative impacts on educational
attainment via mechanisms such as reduced schooling attendance (see Grossman and Kaestner
(1997) for a survey).   However, these results also raise the question of why Head Start health
spending is important given that health and nutrition services are widely available through other
programs such as WIC (the Supplemental Feeding Program for Women, Infants, and Children),
Food Stamps, EPDST (the Early and Periodic Diagnostic Screening and Treatment Program
which is available to Medicaid-eligible children), and state and federal programs for the
disabled.  It is possible that  Head Start acts as a “case coordinator” and helps insure that
children who need these other programs actually receive the benefits to which they are entitled. 
Alternatively,  the combination of specialized services with preschool education may be32
especially helpful.   
VI. Discussion and Conclusions
There are several important limitations of our work.  First, although the NLSY sample is
large by the standards of Head Start research, it is small relative to the number of children in
Head Start, and omits some categories of children (such as Hispanics whose mothers were not in
the United States in 1978) entirely.  Moreover, participation in Head Start is based on maternal
reports, and is likely to be measured with some error.   Similarly, the administrative data
available to us was incomplete and subject to measurement error.  These limitations suggest that
further research with better data is warranted.  
Second, we are asking whether spending more on children who are currently in Head
Start would improve their outcomes.  It is important to keep in mind that Head Start has never
been fully funded, and spending more on the children who get into the program rather than
simply expanding the program might not be the best use of additional funds, particularly in light
of evidence that the program as currently run does have lasting beneficial effects on children (c.f.
Garces et al, 2002).
Third, there are at least two reasons to suspect that our results are lower bounds on the
effects of Head Start spending.  As discussed above, the Department of Health and Human
Services is required to consider the neediness of the area when allocating funds, so it is possible
that higher spending programs serve systematically needier children.  Second, there is a good
deal of measurement error in these data, as discussed above, which is likely to bias estimated
effects towards zero.33
Still, we believe that our results have implications beyond the current debate over the re-
authorization of Head Start.  In 1995, 31 percent of America's three year-olds, 61 percent of four
year-olds, and 90 percent of five year-olds received some form of center-based care or attended
kindergarten (National Center for Education Statistics, 1996).    Head Start has served as a model
for state preschools targeted to low-income children in states such as California (U.S. General
Accounting Office, 1995), and also for new (voluntary) universal preschool programs in Georgia
and New York.  The Children's Defense Fund (1999) reports that as of the 1998-99 school year,
724,610 children were participating in state-funded enriched preschool programs.  Hence, the
number of children in state-funded early education initiatives is roughly equal to the 800,000
participants in Head Start and it is more important than ever before to determine what works, and
what doesn’t in early childhood intervention programs.
This study represents a first attempt to “get inside the black box” of Head Start program
design to answer specific questions about the effectiveness of the program.  Our results provide
evidence consistent with both sides of the debate over the future of Head Start.  On the one hand,
we find evidence that higher spending programs are more effective.  In particular, Head Start
children in higher spending programs have larger gains on reading scores, and a lower
probability of repeating grades.   It has been argued that learning to read is the most important
academic milestone for elementary school children, since all other learning rests on this
foundation (National Research Council, 1998).   
Although we need to be cautious about linear extrapolations, our estimates imply that
funding Head Start programs at a per child level similar to the Perry Preschool Program (an
increase in expenditures of roughly 50 percent), would essentially eliminate the gap in reading21  Hanushek (2002) summarizes a large literature finding small or inconsistent effects of
pupil-teacher ratios in elementary schools, while Krueger (2002) argues that the better studies
tend to find positive effects of class size reductions.  Studies of quality in child care centers have
shown that pupil/teacher ratios are only weakly related to indexes of quality such as the Early
Childhood Environment Rating Scale (ECRS), but it is not known how predictive these scales are of
latter achievement (Blau and Currie, forthcoming).
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achievement scores between the average Head Start child and other children.  Moreover, the
effects of spending on test scores are largest for children in poor counties, and among black
children, suggesting that disadvantaged children would benefit disproportionately from increases
in spending.
On the other hand, we also find evidence consistent with the contention that if the goal of
Head Start is to improve child outcomes, then Head Start dollars should be more targeted
towards services for children (health and education) and less targeted at other services (such as
programs for parents and social programs).   Our findings suggest that a reallocation of funds
along these lines would increase test scores and reduce behavior problems and grade repetition. 
Of course, it could be argued that providing services for parents and improving the home
environment is one of the mandates of Head Start.  This study is silent on the question of
whether higher Head Start spending benefits parents and other household members.
Our examination of specific educational inputs suggests that if the share of Head Start
dollars spent on education was increased, it would be more productive to reduce pupil/teacher
ratios than to further increase teacher qualifications and salaries.  While this finding cannot be
the last word on this very controversial subject
21, it does suggest that legislators should be
cautious about abrogating local control of budgets by requiring that Head Start funds be spent in
a particular way (e.g. on hiring teachers with B.A. degrees) in the absence of any evidence that35
these constraints will have the intended effect on child outcomes.  36
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Westat Inc.Table 1: Comparison Agency Characteristics in Administrative Data Set and in NLSY Sample
123 4 5 6 7 89
Agencies Agencies Percap>= Percap NLSY NLSY NLSY NLSY NLSY
Variable w Funding w/o Fund. $4,000 <$4000 All Poor county White Black Hispanic
Enrollment 487 473 481 491 704 860 560 830 877
[522] [510] [494] [542] [669] [841] [481] [717] [885]
Per Capita Funding 3934 4978 3109 3538 3384 3599 3465 3495
[1276] [1094] [653] [1260] [1163] [1231] [1238] [1351]
Per Cap. Funding + In Kind 5251 6575 4204 4793 4619 4894 4748 4611
[1649] [1417] [894] [1981] [1543] [2097] [1999] [1609]
% spent - education 0.409 0.407 0.390 0.424 0.416 0.429 0.406 0.419 0.438
[0.093] [0.092] [0.086] [0.096] [0.098] [0.102] [0.095] [.104] [0.096]
% spent - total health related 0.118 0.114 0.119 0.118 0.109 0.107 0.112 0.105 0.108
[.046] 0.043 [0.046] [0.046] [0.040] [0.039] [0.040] [0.044] [0.036]
% spent - other 0.473 0.479 0.491 0.458 0.475 0.464 0.482 0.477 0.453
[.091] 0.088 [0.083] [0.093] [0.094] [0.100] [0.090] [0.103] [0.089]
Fraction white, non Hisp. 0.510 0.587 0.413 0.587 0.375 0.291 0.493 0.230 0.296
[0.385] [0.350] [0.398] [0.358] [0.324] [0.302] [0.340] [0.241] [0.278]
Fraction black 0.281 0.291 0.267 0.288 0.414 0.441 0.344 0.661 0.223
[0.326] [.0329] [0.314] [0.332] [0.329] [0.357] [0.299] [0.281] [0.248]
Fraction Hispanic 0.113 0.114 0.120 0.109 0.185 0.244 0.131 0.095 0.446
[0.209] [0.209] [0.203] [0.212] [0.250] [0.306] [0.185] [0.164] [0.311]
Pupil/classroom staff ratio 9.778 9.733 9.143 10.125 10.970 10.711 11.010 10.935 10.923
[2.690] [2.890] [2.306] [2.818] [3.145] [3.07] [3.027] [3.156] [3.40]
Pupil/teacher ratio 22.732 22.394 21.097 23.639 24.527 23.573 25.505 23.251 24.013
[9.784] [9.282] [8.498] [10.319] [8.623] [8.691] [9.352] [7.432] [8.10]
Teacher Salary 16427.53 15180.71 17797.01 15850.33 18198.37 18168.85 18151.70 17708.48 19024.54
[5687] 5550.25 [5212.59] [5779.13] [6773.39] [6242.18] [6625.13] [6957.69] [6777.65]
Fraction qualified teachers 0.848 0.865 0.868 0.837 0.857 0.861 0.866 0.840 0.862
[0.186] [0.183] [0.173] [0.193] [.171] [0.168] [0.169] [0.161] [0.185]
Average teacher has BA+ 0.222 0.318 0.224 0.217 0.280 0.241 0.309 0.266 0.230
[0.416] [0.466] [0.417] [0.412] [0.449] [0.428] [0.462] [0.442] [0.421]
Director has BA+ 0.644 0.809 0.627 0.672 0.793 0.763 0.777 0.842 0.759
[0.479] [0.393] [0.484] [0.470] [0.405] [0.425] [0.416] [0.365] [0.428]
Director's Years Experience 10.306 10.090 10.439 10.092 9.449 10.137 9.141 9.815 9.669
[8.545] [8.489] [8.641] [8.386] [7.587] [7.485] [7.646] [7.861] [6.985]
Director's Salary 36876.55 37558.69 35183.74 39577.62 41698.00 41463.72 40477.64 42805.18 43007.73
[11772.99] [12529.12] [11559.39] [11606.81] [12585.26] [13618.33] [11635.05] [13042.72] [13777.50]
# Observations 14532 4734 6419 8113 4468 1984 2238 1324 906
Notes: Standard deviations in brackets.Table 2: Means in NLSY Sample
12 3 4 5678
Ever PIAT PIAT Behavior Repeat Mother
Head St. Math RR PIAT-RC PPVT Problems Grade AFQT
Panel 1: Sample Means
1. All 0.227 51.03 58.26 54.27 37.69 57.58 0.123 36.38
[23.85] [24.66] [23.97] [28.68] [25.17] [.329] [27.09]
2. Counties with >11% 0.265 46.88 54.28 50.39 29.96 59.24 0.154 28.87
Families in Poverty [23.26] [24.74] [23.73] [26.63] [24.46] [.361] [24.72]
3. Whites 0.142 59.25 64.17 61.27 51.09 55.51 0.086 50.97
[22.54] [23.37] [22.56] [26.70] [25.83] [0.281] [25.80]
4. Blacks 0.388 41.33 51.76 46.09 22.01 60.52 0.182 19.89
[22.22] [24.50] [22.75] [22.70] [24.43] [.386] [17.64]
5. Hispanics 0.204 45.28 53.42 50 29.79 58.32 0.127 24.43
[22.49] [24.52] [24.10] [26.28] [23.95] [0.334] [21.34]
Panel 2: Mean Differences Head Start and Other Children
1. All -9.058 -8.729 -10.315 -13.868 3.696 0.122 -13.325
[0.854] [0.885] [0.919] [1.151] [0.906] [0.015] [0.946]
2. Counties with >11% -7.288 -8.399 -9.322 -9.768 2.996 0.129 -11.294
Families in Poverty [1.182] [1.258] [1.291] [1.515] [1.248] [0.022] [1.233]
3. Whites -6.657 -5.541 -5.854 -7.486 3.349 0.101 -7.447
[1.392] [1.446] [1.586] [1.925] [1.591] [0.023] [1.555]
4. Blacks -1.973 -5.867 -5.776 -5.205 3.35 0.091 -5.223
[1.254] [1.387] [1.350] [1.428] [1.387] [0.026] [0.985]
5. Hispanics -7.793 -7.255 -9.45 -8.531 -0.839 0.122 -5.077
[1.874] [2.050] [2.114] [2.461] [1.989] [0.033] [1.752]
Panel 3: Mean Differences Head Start and Other Children Adjusted for Observables
1. All -0.75 -2.603 -3.737 -2.082 2.429 0.074
[0.809] [0.851] [0.868] [1.027] [0.953] [0.016]
2. Counties with >11% -0.92 -3.502 -4.676 -2.227 2.401 0.099
Families in Poverty [1.147] [1.220] [1.231] [1.380] [1.290] [0.024]
3. Whites -1.584 -1.213 -2.705 -0.85 3.85 0.046
[1.387] [1.427] [1.557] [1.968] [1.680] [0.025]
4. Blacks 1.884 -2.383 -2.705 -1.503 3.304 0.071
[1.235] [1.334] [1.265] [1.338] [1.438] [0.027]
5. Hispanics -5.863 -5.387 -7.118 -3.999 -0.303 0.134
[1.844] [1.964] [2.021] [2.342] [2.037] [0.035]
Standard deviations in brackets in Panel 1.  Standard errors in brackets in Panels 2 and 3.Table 3: Effect of Head Start on Outcomes
12345 6
Behavior Repeated
PIAT-Math PIAT-RR PIAT-RC PPVT Problems Grade
Ever Head Start*per  0.397 1.749 1.428 1.677 0.137 0
  capita spending [0.569] [0.598] [0.631] [0.738] [0.677] [0.012]
Per capita spending -0.214 -0.302 -0.95 -0.621 0.127 0.018
[0.394] [0.414] [0.419] [0.496] [0.466] [0.007]
Ever Head Start? -2.184 -8.936 -8.72 -7.789 1.929 0.074
[2.214] [2.326] [2.370] [2.714] [2.627] [0.044]
Mother's AFQT 0.246 0.245 0.274 0.315 0.073 -0.001
[0.018] [0.019] [0.019] [0.022] [0.021] [0.000]
Permanent Income 0.081 0.072 0.049 0.095 -0.19 -0.001
[0.018] [0.019] [0.019] [0.023] [0.021] [0.000]
Mother drop out -0.829 -11.346 -8.399 3.883 -16.488 0.208
[10.299] [10.816] [10.271] [13.112] [12.192] [0.184]
Mother high school 3.235 -6.406 -2.547 7.449 -22.288 0.111
[10.313] [10.831] [10.287] [13.126] [12.209] [0.184]
Mother Some College 3.751 -4.302 -2.162 8.68 -21.711 0.092
[10.324] [10.842] [10.298] [13.136] [12.221] [0.184]
Mother College 6.423 -3.798 -2.547 11.357 -26.199 0.091
[10.368] [10.889] [10.348] [13.197] [12.272] [0.185]
Mother Black -7.5 -0.619 -1.738 -10.957 0.748 -0.009
[1.047] [1.101] [1.104] [1.306] [1.225] [0.020]
Mother Hispanic -3.871 -0.129 0.021 -5.593 0.216 -0.047
[1.123] [1.182] [1.184] [1.401] [1.315] [0.021]
Child Male -0.804 -5.164 -3.699 -0.251 -1.506 0.029
[0.624] [0.656] [0.657] [0.779] [0.733] [0.012]
Child First Born 2.766 5.83 6.073 6.803 0.577 -0.01
[0.695] [0.731] [0.727] [0.858] [0.817] [0.013]
Child > 5 sibs -7.408 -6.046 -2.943 -7.64 -2.86 0.042
[1.761] [1.850] [1.967] [2.286] [2.092] [0.032]
# sibs mother in 1979 -0.289 -0.027 -0.299 -0.752 -0.666 -0.002
[0.182] [0.191] [0.191] [0.227] [0.215] [0.003]
County population, 1990 -0.055 -0.079 -0.019 -0.065 -0.007 0
  100,000s [0.027] [0.028] [0.029] [0.034] [0.032] [0.001]
% population black, 1990 11.85 6.709 1.673 -13.13 -6.27 -0.138
[5.320] [5.589] [5.590] [6.561] [6.213] [0.100]
% population Hispanic, 1990 0.019 0.025 0.036 -0.124 -0.057 0
[0.054] [0.057] [0.056] [0.067] [0.064] [0.001]
% births to teen moms, 1988 -0.246 -0.154 0.114 -0.115 0.272 0.002
[0.148] [0.155] [0.156] [0.185] [0.174] [0.003]
Median family income, 1989 0.021 -0.038 -0.077 0.081 0.408 0.005
[0.115] [0.120] [0.121] [0.144] [0.134] [0.002]
% families below poverty, 1989 -0.085 -0.198 -0.409 -0.029 0.291 0.005
[0.180] [0.189] [0.189] [0.223] [0.211] [0.003]
% votes for Democrat president, 1 -0.027 -0.005 0.063 0.11 -0.005 0.002
[0.068] [0.071] [0.071] [0.084] [0.079] [0.001]
% pop < 18 years, 1990 -0.059 -0.073 0.092 -0.067 0.051 0.001
[0.221] [0.233] [0.234] [0.279] [0.258] [0.004]
% pop > 64 years, 1990 -0.046 -0.002 0.108 0.116 0.052 -0.002
[0.155] [0.163] [0.164] [0.195] [0.181] [0.003]
Last year HS, 1988-89 2.882 -0.092 -0.757 2.057 0.527 0.082
[1.175] [1.237] [1.232] [1.359] [1.384] [0.023]
  1990-91 1.507 -1.256 -1.497 0.795 0.147 0.078[1.201] [1.264] [1.259] [1.388] [1.410] [0.023]
  1992-93 3.467 1.153 3.72 3.139 -3.448 0.025
[1.221] [1.284] [1.284] [1.428] [1.436] [0.021]
  1994-95 2.751 2.094 5.591 4.333 -5.767 -0.009
[1.322] [1.391] [1.393] [1.795] [1.554] [0.021]
  1996-97 1.823 4.5 11.137 0.353 -11.089 0
[1.490] [1.568] [1.618] [2.146] [1.752] [0.000]
  1998-99 4.826 7.2 16.213 4.22 -10.095 0
[1.765] [1.854] [2.388] [2.511] [2.098] [0.000]
Observations 4278 4272 3822 3372 4349 2972
R-squared 0.29 0.27 0.31 0.4 0.11 0.11
Note: Standard errors in brackets.  Models also include state fixed effects.Table 4: Effects of Head Start on Outcomes, Alternative Specifications and Samples
1234 5 6
Behavior Repeated
PIAT-Math PIAT-RR PIAT-RC PPVT Problems Grade
1. Counties with > 11% of Families in Poverty
Ever Head Start*per  1.027 2.293 1.871 1.674 0.096 -0.003
  capita spending [0.908] [0.965] [1.021] [1.136] [1.025] [0.020]
Per capita spending -0.135 -0.279 -1 -1.221 -0.07 0.008
[0.694] [0.737] [0.749] [0.854] [0.789] [0.014]
Ever Head Start? -4.475 -11.447 -10.899 -7.649 2.071 0.108
[3.341] [3.551] [3.625] [3.961] [3.768] [0.071]
AFQT 0.234 0.266 0.287 0.285 0 -0.001
[0.029] [0.031] [0.030] [0.035] [0.032] [0.001]
Observations 1907 1906 1721 1533 1925 1333
R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.3 0.37 0.16 0.13
2. White
Ever Head Start*per  0.788 1.363 0.759 2.169 0.067 -0.041
  capita spending [0.961] [0.987] [1.109] [1.415] [1.160] [0.019]
Per capita spending -0.366 -0.036 -0.59 -0.361 0.6 0.013
[0.562] [0.578] [0.598] [0.766] [0.681] [0.009]
Ever Head Start? -4.608 -6.502 -5.508 -8.771 3.522 0.197
[3.970] [4.076] [4.477] [5.534] [4.796] [0.075]
AFQT 0.249 0.237 0.272 0.31 0.084 -0.001
[0.023] [0.024] [0.024] [0.031] [0.028] [0.000]
Observations 2127 2124 1858 1632 2184 1475
R-squared 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.13 0.13
3. Black
Ever Head Start*per  1.892 2.335 1.844 1.713 0.046 0.014
  capita spending [0.959] [1.035] [1.018] [1.062] [1.146] [0.022]
Per capita spending -1.166 -1.076 -1.579 -0.134 -0.294 0.018
[0.814] [0.879] [0.832] [0.882] [0.961] [0.017]
Ever Head Start? -4.69 -10.51 -8.886 -7.132 3.156 0.024
[3.559] [3.842] [3.645] [3.734] [4.229] [0.080]
AFQT 0.238 0.29 0.347 0.395 0.027 -0.004
[0.044] [0.047] [0.045] [0.047] [0.051] [0.001]
Observations 1280 1280 1168 1038 1287 891
R-squared 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.3 0.12 0.16
4. Hispanic
Ever Head Start*per  -1.361 0.596 0.715 1.972 -0.206 0.018
  capita spending [1.301] [1.387] [1.540] [1.695] [1.439] [0.025]
Per capita spending 0.354 0.543 -0.836 -1.285 -0.555 0.022
[0.864] [0.921] [0.975] [1.114] [0.965] [0.016]
Ever Head Start? -0.992 -7.554 -9.544 -10.6 0.46 0.069
[5.011] [5.340] [5.646] [6.183] [5.543] [0.097]
AFQT 0.266 0.266 0.231 0.273 0.094 0.001
[0.047] [0.050] [0.051] [0.059] [0.052] [0.001]
Observations 871 868 796 702 878 606
R-squared 0.25 0.28 0.29 0.33 0.17 0.16
5. Alternative Per Capita Spending Measure that Includes all Cash and In-Kind
Ever Head Start*per  0.198 1.369 0.93 1.148 -0.045 0.003
  capita spending [0.432] [0.454] [0.476] [0.565] [0.512] [0.009]
Per capita spending -0.13 -0.086 -0.143 -0.06 0.169 0.008
[0.201] [0.211] [0.206] [0.262] [0.237] [0.003]Ever Head Start? -1.709 -9.257 -8.108 -7.348 2.647 0.061
[2.252] [2.365] [2.400] [2.787] [2.664] [0.044]
AFQT 0.246 0.245 0.274 0.315 0.073 -0.001
[0.018] [0.019] [0.019] [0.022] [0.021] [0.000]
Observations 4278 4272 3822 3372 4349 2972
R-squared 0.29 0.27 0.31 0.4 0.11 0.11
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.  All models are specified similarly to those in Table 3.Table 5: Effects of Spending on the Selection of Head Start Mothers
Panel A: Dependent variable=AFQT of mother.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
                     Subgroup: All Poor White Black Hispanic
Ever Head Start*per  0.673 -0.558 2.479 1.878 -0.719
  capita spending [0.598] [0.983] [1.126] [0.761] [1.177]
Per capita spending 0.048 0.877 1.182 -1.382 -0.78
[0.415] [0.746] [0.666] [0.641] [0.782]
Ever Head Start? -8.308 -9.059 -18.174 -11.412 0.608
[2.330] [3.615] [4.635] [2.831] [4.547]
Observations 4427 1961 2220 1310 897
R-squared 0.37 0.21 0.13 0.18 0.29
Panel B: Dependent variable=Child Low Birth Weight
Ever Head Start*per  -0.012 -0.009 -0.002 -0.025 -0.001
  capita spending [0.008] [0.013] [0.012] [0.016] [0.017]
Per capita spending 0.006 0 0.001 0.017 0.006
[0.005] [0.010] [0.007] [0.013] [0.012]
Ever Head Start? 0.047 0.029 -0.015 0.097 -0.017
[0.029] [0.048] [0.049] [0.058] [0.064]
Observations 4244 1813 2097 1205 827
R-squared 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.11
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.  The models also included all of the independent variables
shown in Table 3.Table 6: Effects of Different Budget Components on Outcomes
123456
Behavior Repeated
All PIAT-Math PIAT-RR PIAT-RC PPVT Problems Grade
Ever Head Start * 0.44 1.824 1.454 1.736 0.039 0
  Per capita spending [0.572] [0.600] [0.633] [0.741] [0.679] [0.006]
Per capita spending -0.224 -0.292 -0.917 -0.643 0.135 -0.002
[0.396] [0.416] [0.421] [0.498] [0.468] [0.004]
Ever Head Start * 26.744 47.501 34.487 21.121 -35.164 -0.2
  Share Health [18.858] [19.782] [20.608] [24.369] [22.210] [0.194]
Share Health -12.682 -13.568 0.005 -9.799 10.826 0.185
[10.165] [10.674] [10.901] [13.011] [11.897] [0.105]
Ever Head Start * -7.014 -5.247 -3.473 -11.866 -16.191 -0.212
  Share Education [7.935] [8.332] [8.507] [9.825] [9.303] [0.081]
Share Education -1.282 3.699 3.448 -6.395 -7.093 -0.004
[4.507] [4.735] [4.733] [5.686] [5.277] [0.046]
Ever Head Start  -2.28 -12.15 -11.071 -5.228 12.874 0.119
[5.032] [5.282] [5.396] [6.189] [5.897] [0.052]
Observations 4278 4272 3822 3372 4349 4365
R-squared 0.29 0.27 0.31 0.41 0.11 0.03
Counties with >11% Families in Poverty
Ever Head Start * 1.143 2.431 1.822 1.786 0.01 -0.005
  Per capita spending [0.911] [0.968] [1.024] [1.139] [1.027] [0.010]
Per capita spending -0.242 -0.264 -0.894 -1.33 -0.122 0
[0.698] [0.741] [0.753] [0.859] [0.793] [0.007]
Ever Head Start * 40.142 63.61 26.394 21.559 -43.528 -0.391
  Share Health [25.620] [27.225] [28.746] [32.542] [29.047] [0.275]
Share Health -29.637 -19.744 14.478 -26.78 9.221 0.219
[17.347] [18.430] [19.364] [22.333] [19.550] [0.185]
Ever Head Start * -5.016 5.63 -4.446 -2.391 -26.199 -0.295
  Share Education [10.511] [11.171] [11.329] [12.530] [11.791] [0.111]
Share Education -7.262 -1.733 0.666 -11.471 5.82 -0.029
[6.897] [7.336] [7.223] [8.240] [7.753] [0.073]
Ever Head Start  -7 -21.143 -11.725 -9.306 18.231 0.204
[6.843] [7.273] [7.340] [8.119] [7.654] [0.073]
Observations 1907 1906 1721 1533 1925 1945
R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.3 0.37 0.16 0.05
Counties with >11% Families in Poverty -- Share of Health and Education Together
Ever Head Start * 1.048 2.334 1.864 1.729 0.034 -0.004
  Per capita spending [0.910] [0.967] [1.022] [1.136] [1.024] [0.010]
Per capita spending -0.206 -0.265 -0.996 -1.298 -0.115 -0.001
[0.695] [0.739] [0.750] [0.855] [0.790] [0.007]
Ever Head Start * -1.857 10.157 -1.299 -1.042 -27.589 -0.294
  Share on Ed&Health [10.325] [10.978] [11.134] [12.285] [11.585] [0.110]
Share on Ed&Health -8.358 -2.513 1.442 -12.062 5.958 -0.014
[6.838] [7.276] [7.170] [8.196] [7.676] [0.073]
Ever Head Start   -3.543 -17.014 -10.183 -7.305 17.027 0.192
[6.575] [6.992] [7.024] [7.721] [7.335] [0.070]
Observations 1907 1906 1721 1533 1925 1945
R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.3 0.37 0.16 0.04
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.  All models include the other independent variables
in Table 3.Table 7: Effects of Individual Educational Inputs
123456
Behavior Repeated
PIAT-Math PIAT-RR PIAT-RC PPVT Problems Grade
Pupil-Teacher Ratio
Ever Head Start * 0.648 2.017 1.907 1.637 0.081 -0.005
  Per Capita Expenditure [0.591] [0.623] [0.656] [0.770] [0.703] [0.012]
Per Capita Expenditure -0.118 -0.399 -1.124 -0.421 -0.204 0.016
[0.418] [0.440] [0.443] [0.522] [0.494] [0.008]
Pupil-Teacher Ratio -3.149 -9.604 -11.145 -8.249 -2.116 0.106
  * Ever Head Start [3.397] [3.573] [3.604] [4.191] [4.003] [0.064]
Pupil-Teacher Ratio 0.003 -0.013 0.037 0.022 0.172 -0.001
[0.095] [0.100] [0.100] [0.118] [0.111] [0.002]
Observations 4204 4198 3766 3323 4277 2929
R-squared 0.29 0.27 0.31 0.41 0.11 0.11
Pupil-Classroom Staff Ratio
Ever Head Start * 0.597 1.921 1.853 1.6 0.14 -0.005
  Per Capita Expenditure [0.594] [0.625] [0.659] [0.774] [0.706] [0.012]
Per Capita Expenditure -0.023 -0.379 -1.074 -0.41 -0.155 0.017
[0.421] [0.443] [0.445] [0.526] [0.497] [0.008]
Pupil-Classroom Staff Ratio -2.538 -7.311 -9.966 -7.541 -4.479 0.11
  * Ever Head Start [3.844] [4.040] [4.094] [4.778] [4.520] [0.072]
Pupil-Classroom Staff Ratio -0.029 -0.203 -0.008 -0.003 0.577 -0.002
[0.255] [0.268] [0.271] [0.320] [0.299] [0.005]
Observations 4205 4199 3767 3324 4278 2930
R-squared 0.29 0.27 0.31 0.4 0.11 0.11
Fraction of Teachers with Qualifications
Ever Head Start * 0.655 2.068 1.951 1.762 -0.127 -0.005
  Per Capita Expenditure [0.591] [0.621] [0.654] [0.771] [0.703] [0.012]
Per Capita Expenditure 0.02 -0.302 -1.048 -0.444 -0.135 0.013
[0.414] [0.435] [0.437] [0.516] [0.488] [0.008]
Fraction Qualified Teachers -3.331 -4.298 -7.654 -8.028 4.391 -0.004
  * Ever Head Start [4.681] [4.924] [4.912] [5.869] [5.518] [0.090]
Fraction Qualified Teachers 0.387 3.079 1.122 2.026 -2.287 0.001
[2.249] [2.367] [2.347] [2.774] [2.633] [0.041]
Observations 4205 4199 3767 3323 4278 2930
R-squared 0.29 0.27 0.31 0.41 0.11 0.11
Teacher Salary ($1,000)
Ever Head Start * 0.677 2.185 2.177 2.052 0.144 0
  Per Capita Expenditure [0.703] [0.740] [0.785] [0.956] [0.826] [0.014]
Per Capita Expenditure 0.023 -0.094 -0.713 -0.372 -0.132 0.022
[0.481] [0.506] [0.514] [0.610] [0.564] [0.009]
Lead Teacher Salary -0.159 -0.079 -0.143 -0.137 0.003 -0.002
  * Ever Head Start [0.128] [0.134] [0.140] [0.164] [0.151] [0.003]
Lead Teacher Salary 0.194 0.067 0.081 -0.072 -0.151 0.002
[0.068] [0.071] [0.072] [0.087] [0.078] [0.001]
Observations 4026 4019 3613 3196 4092 2803
R-squared 0.29 0.27 0.31 0.41 0.11 0.12Table 7, continued
123456
Behavior Repeated
PIAT-Math PIAT-RR PIAT-RC PPVT Problems Grade
Average Teacher BA or More Education
Ever Head Start * 0.41 1.765 1.415 1.543 0.054 -0.001
  Per Capita Expenditure [0.576] [0.606] [0.637] [0.747] [0.684] [0.012]
Per Capita Expenditure -0.209 -0.3 -0.936 -0.594 0.133 0.018
[0.394] [0.414] [0.419] [0.496] [0.467] [0.007]
Teacher BA+ -1.084 -0.782 -0.505 1.86 1.743 0.011
  * Ever Head Start [1.658] [1.740] [1.800] [2.084] [1.949] [0.032]
Teacher BA+ -1.89 -8.75 -8.502 -7.84 1.711 0.073
[2.223] [2.335] [2.382] [2.726] [2.639] [0.044]
Observations 4278 4272 3822 3372 4349 2972
R-squared 0.29 0.27 0.31 0.4 0.11 0.11
Director BA or More Education
Ever Head Start * 0.35 1.705 1.335 1.677 0.251 0.001
  Per Capita Expenditure [0.571] [0.599] [0.633] [0.740] [0.679] [0.012]
Per Capita Expenditure -0.183 -0.283 -0.96 -0.629 0.051 0.017
[0.396] [0.415] [0.420] [0.497] [0.467] [0.007]
Director BA+ -1.959 -1.989 -4.814 -0.375 4.354 0.029
  * Ever Head Start [1.891] [1.986] [2.031] [2.509] [2.225] [0.035]
Director BA+ 0.955 0.563 -0.84 -0.64 -2.414 -0.013
[0.983] [1.032] [1.027] [1.301] [1.155] [0.018]
Observations 4278 4272 3822 3372 4349 2972
R-squared 0.29 0.27 0.31 0.4 0.11 0.11
Head Start Director's Salary
Ever Head Start * 0.59 1.89 1.94 2.223 0.002 -0.004
  Per Capita Expenditure [0.633] [0.664] [0.706] [0.836] [0.751] [0.013]
Per Capita Expenditure -0.119 -0.163 -0.918 -0.52 0.034 0.015
[0.424] [0.444] [0.448] [0.531] [0.498] [0.008]
Head Start Director's Salary 0 0.034 -0.021 -0.158 -0.008 0
  * Ever Head Start [0.063] [0.066] [0.068] [0.084] [0.074] [0.001]
Head Start Director's Salary 0.055 0.005 -0.002 0.053 -0.08 -0.001
[0.035] [0.037] [0.037] [0.045] [0.041] [0.001]
Observations 4148 4142 3712 3275 4219 2892
R-squared 0.29 0.27 0.31 0.41 0.11 0.11
Head Start Director's Years of Experience
Ever Head Start * 0.623 2.005 1.828 1.675 -0.004 -0.005
  Per Capita Expenditure [0.588] [0.619] [0.654] [0.767] [0.699] [0.012]
Per Capita Expenditure 0.039 -0.097 -0.908 -0.346 -0.206 0.013
[0.411] [0.433] [0.436] [0.514] [0.485] [0.008]
Director's Years of Experience -0.122 -0.06 0.02 0.049 -0.115 -0.001
  * Ever Head Start [0.099] [0.104] [0.106] [0.124] [0.116] [0.002]
Director's Years of Experience 0.038 0.08 0.085 -0.136 -0.022 0
[0.051] [0.053] [0.053] [0.064] [0.059] [0.001]
Observations 4203 4197 3761 3317 4274 2926
R-squared 0.29 0.27 0.31 0.41 0.11 0.11
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.  All models include the other independent variables
in Table 3.